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Abstract
In the current work the effects of hop-by-hop packet loss and retransmissions via ARQ protocols are
investigated within a Mobile Ad-hoc NET-work (MANET). Errors occur due to outages and a success probability
function is related to each link, which can be controlled by power and rate allocation. We first derive the expression
for the network’s capacity region, where the success function plays a critical role. Properties of the latter as well
as the related maximum goodput function are presented and proved. A Network Utility Maximization problem
(NUM) with stability constraints is further formulated which decomposes into (a) the input rate control problem
and (b) the scheduling problem. Under certain assumptions problem (b) is relaxed to a weighted sum maximization
problem with number of summants equal to the number of nodes. This further allows the formulation of a non-
cooperative game where each node decides independently over its transmitting power through a chosen link. Use
of supermodular game theory suggests a price based algorithm that converges to a power allocation satisfying
the necessary optimality conditions of (b). Implementation issues are considered so that minimum information
exchange between interfering nodes is required. Simulations illustrate that the suggested algorithm brings near
optimal results.
Index Terms
Automatic Retransmission reQuest Protocols, Network Stability, Network Utility Maximization, Distributed
Power Control, Supermodular Games
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The current work considers a Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET) where data flows entering from
a set of source nodes should be routed to their destinations. In such networks a major concern is the
maximum set of incoming rates that can be supported, since interference is the bottleneck. If a utility
function is related to each incoming flow a very interesting problem is to maximize the sum of all utilities
under the constraint that the queues of all nodes remain stable. Such problems have been addressed in
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and algorithms that optimally adapt the incoming rates and the transmission powers
of each node have been suggested.
In the current work we are interested in bringing these models a step further and investigate how
the stability regions and the optimal policies for congestion control, routing and power allocation vary,
when the queues of each node use ARQ protocols to repeat transmissions of erroneous packets due
to outages. In the current literature, investigations already addressing the network utility maximization
(NUM) problem with erroneous transmissions through the links consider mainly fixed routing. In [6] the
model does not consider queueing aspects and a NUM problem with rate-outage constraints per link is
approximately solved. In [7] the effect of end-to-end error probability is included in the utility of each
source. The same problem with average power and reliability requirements is posed and algorithmically
solved in [8]. Furthermore, in [9] a single hop ad-hoc network with outages is considered where a
solution for joint admission control, rate and power allocation is derived based on a stochastic game
formulation. Other contributions that investigate the effect of retransmissions in MANETs incorporating
Random Access MAC protocols include [10], [11].
Motivated by a comment in [12] where it is stated that "in practical communication systems, the link
capacity should be defined appropriately, taking packet loss and retransmissions into account, hence the
flow conservation law holds for goodputs instead of rates", and after a presentation of the model under
study in Section II, we derive in Section III the goodput capacity region. The success probability for the
transmission over a wireless link depends on the entire power allocation and the scheduled transmission
rate. We constrain our investigations to functions with specific properties presented in section IV, where
it is shown that these also hold for the expression with Rayleigh fading [13]. The NUM problem
naturally decomposes in Section V into the input rate control and the scheduling problem.
At this point a major challenge is to achieve a decentralized solution of the second problem. This
is always possible of course for the case of parallel channels (see also [12] and [14]). Algorithmic
suggestions can be found in [2] for zero-full power allocations and in [15] by solving a maximum
weighted matching problem over a conflict graph. In our work fully distributed implementation is
achieved by approaching the second problem with the arsenal of supermodular game theory in section
VI - an idea appearing in [16] and [17] - and result to the suggestion of a price based algortithm in
3VI.D and VI.E that achieves almost optimal solutions with minimum information exchange between the
nodes. Simulation results are finally presented in section VII.
II. MODEL UNDER STUDY
We consider a wireless network consisting of N nodes N = {1, . . . , N}, while L is the set of all
possible L = N · (N − 1) links. The time is divided into slots of equal duration T (normalized to 1)
and t = {0, 1, . . .} is the time index. Data flows enter the network at source nodes and are removed at
destination nodes D = {1, . . . , D}. The set of data flows (commodity flows) injected into the network at
a source node with a predefined destination is denoted by S = {1, . . . , S}. The routes of the data flows
through the network are not fixed. Furthermore, each link l ∈ L is characterized by an origin node b (l)
(begin) and an end node e (l) (end). At each node n, a total of D buffers - one for each commodity
flow - are reserved (see also Fig.1).
In the general case investigated, each node n ∈ N chooses at slot t a power pl (t) as well as a rate
µl (t) to transmit data through link l, as long as n = b (l). The total transmission rate of packets through
link l at some time slot t is the sum of the transmission rates of the individual commodities sharing
the link meaning µl (t) =
∑D
d=1 µ
d
l (t). Scheduled packets of variable length µdl (t) for each commodity
d are combined into a common packet of length µl (t) and sent through the link. The resulting long
packet may be received at node e (l) with errors due to fading and interference. The probability of
successful transmission is then a real valued function q (~p, µ) : RN ·(N−1)+ ×M → [0, 1] of the entire
power allocation at slot t, ~p (t) ∈ Π ⊆ RN ·(N−1)+ and the scheduled rate µl (t). The set of all possible
scheduling rates is denoted by M. The nodes have power restrictions, e.g. ∀n,
∑
l:n=b(l) pl (t) ≤ Pn
and Π is the convex compact set of all feasible power allocations.
Examples of such success probability functions for flat block-fading channels can be found using the
outage probability definition [18]. Given an SINRl threshold value γ (µl) = eµl − 1 of link l (we often
simply write γl := γ (µl))
ql (~p, µl) = P (SINRl (~p) ≥ e
µl − 1) , SINRl (~p) =
GllFllpl∑
j 6=lGljFljpj + σ
2
e(l)
(1)
where Ylj stands for Yb(j)e(l), µl is the scheduled transmission rate through the link, Gb(j)e(l) is the
slow varying path gain and Fb(j)e(l) is the associated flat fading component of the channel. For the
case of Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading (meaning Rayleigh slow fading for both the desired and interference
signals), a closed form expression of (1) can be found in [13] and [19]
ql (~p, µl) = exp
(
−σ2γl
Gllpl
)∏
j 6=l
(
1 +
γlGljpj
Gllpl
)−1
. (2)
4Observe that the success functions used imply that only the channel fast fading statistics are known and
the nodes have no other instantaneous channel state information (CSI) over the fading gains, except -
possibly - the slow varying path gains. The actual amount of data transmitted through each link equals
µl (t) · Xl (t). Xl (t) is a binary random variable which equals 1 for success (with prob. ql) and 0 for
failure (with prob. 1− ql). The expected transmission rate through link l is then
gl (~p, µl) := µl · ql (~p, µl) (3)
and is called the goodput of link l [20], [21]. Furthermore, in the analysis that follows we often encounter
a quantity called maximum goodput defined as (see [20] and [22] for parallel Rayleigh fading channels)
gl (~p) = max
µl∈M
µl · ql (~p, µl) . (4)
In case a packet of length µl (t) is received at node e (l) with errors, we assume that this can always
be detected during decoding. When reception is correct an ACK is fed back otherwise a NAK signal
is transmitted to b (l) via a reliable zero-delay wireless feedback link. In the latter case the packets of
all transmitted commodities are then not removed from the buffer but wait for a future retransmission
(Stop-and-Wait ARQ) under some new scheduling decision. The queue evolution for each node n and
commodity flow d at slot t, is given by
udn (t+ 1) =

udn (t)− ∑
k:n=b(k)
µdk (t)Xk (t)


+
+
∑
l:n=e(l)
µdl (t)Xl (t) + α
d
n (t+ 1) . (5)
The success probability of the transmission through link l is equal for all commodities d, since it
depends on the sum rate µl. In the expression (5),
∑
k:n=b(k) µ
d
k (t)Xk (t) is the actual outgoing data
("actual" meaning "error free") from node n, ∑l:n=e(l) µdl (t)Xl (t) is the actual incoming data from
links l ∈ L : n = e (l), n 6= d and αdn (t+ 1) is the amount of commodity d bits arriving exogenously
to the network at node n during t.
We associate each incoming flow to the network at node n with destination d ∈ D, αdn = αs, with
a utility function Us : R+ → R+. The utility function takes as argument the average incoming data
rate E (αs) = xs and is non-decreasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable over the range
xs ≥ 0 (elastic traffic, [23]). The utilities describe the satisfaction received by transmitting data from
node s ∈ S to d ∈ D.
The aim here is to find an incoming rate vector ~x = (x1, . . . , xS) to maximize the sum of the utilities∑
s∈S Us (xs) subject to the constraint that the system remains stable and furthermore explicitly provide
5the stabilizing scheduling policy ∀~x ∈ Λ. Λ denotes the capacity region of the system, the largest set
of ~x for which the system remains stable. Formally we write
max
∑
s∈S
Us (xs) subject to ~x ∈ Λ. (6)
III. NETWORK CAPACITY REGION AND VARIATIONS WITH DROPPING PACKET DECISIONS
The problem posed so far is similar to the models investigated in [2], [3], [4] and [15]. Due to the
occurence of errors and the use of retransmissions, the capacity region of the model under investigation
is definitely reduced and has a different expression compared to the works mentioned.
Theorem 1 The capacity region Λ of the wireless network under study is the set of all non-negative
vectors ~x = (x1, . . . , xS) such that there exist multicommodity goodput flow variables
{
gdl
}d∈D
l∈L
, satis-
fying
• gdl ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L, d ∈ D and gdl = 0 if e (l) = d
• ∀n ∈ N , d ∈ D:
∑
l:e(l)=n g
d
l + x
d
n ≤
∑
k:b(k)=n g
d
k
•
∑
d∈D g
d
l ≤ gl, ~g = {gl} ∈ Γ, where Γ = co
(
Γˆ
)
and
Γˆ =
⋃
~p∈Π
{
~g ∈ RN ·(N−1)+ : ∀l ∈ L, gl ≤ µ¯l (~p) · ql (~p, µ¯l (~p)) , µ¯l (~p) = arg max
µl∈M
µl · ql (~p, µl)
}
. (7)
Proof: Similar to the derivation of the network capacity region in [2] and can be found in [24].
In the above
{
gdl
}d∈D
l∈L
is the D ·N · (N−1) size vector of goodput flow variables for all commodities
through the network. An optimal policy achieving stability for all vectors within Λ is a variation of the
well-known backpressure policy [1], [2] where goodputs replace the rate vectors. This is named here
goodput backpressure policy. We further denote with Γ the goodput region of the network, which equals
the convex hull (co) of Γˆ given in (7). Comparing this region to the ones appearing in [2] and [14]
the rate-power mapping rl (~p) = log (1 + SINRl (~p)) is replaced here by the maximum goodput-power
mapping gl (~p).
Let us now assume that the nodes can decide, in addition to the transmission power pl and rate µl
over the link l ∈ L : n = b (l), whether the possibly erroneous packet at time slot t should be dropped
or should be held in the node’s queues and wait to be retransmitted at the next time slot t+ 1. We use
the binary decision variable Al (t) taking values Al (t) = 0 for dropping decision and Al (t) = 1 for a
decision to continue. The single queue evolution will be the same as in (5) where Xl (and similarly
6Xk) should be replaced by the expression 1 − Al (t) (1−Xl (t)) which equals Xl (t) when Al (t) = 1
and 1 when Al (t) = 0.
If the decisions on dropping are randomized, with a fixed probability of dropping per link equal to
1 − δl ∈ [0, 1] (and hence EAl (t) = δl), the network capacity region Λ~δ, ~δ = (δ1, . . . , δL), will be the
same as in Theorem 1 with a modification on the region Γˆ. In this case we have that
Γˆ~δ =
⋃
~p∈Π
{
~g ∈ RN ·(N−1)+ : ∀l ∈ L, gl ≤ µ¯
δl
l
(
1− δl ·
(
1− ql
(
~p, µ¯δll
)))}
(8)
µ¯δll := µ¯l (~p, δl) = argmaxµl∈M µl · (1− δl · (1− ql (~p, µl))). Choice of the vector ~δ = ~1 := (1, . . . , 1)
results in the region of Theorem 1 where no dropping takes place, while for ~δ = ~0 := (0, . . . , 0),
dropping always takes place after an erroneous transmission and this provides the maximum network
capacity region with Γˆ~δ equal to
Γˆ~δ=~0 =
{
~g ∈ RN ·(N−1)+ : ∀l ∈ L, gl ≤ µ
∗
l
}
(9)
where µ∗l = argmaxµl∈M µl is the maximum allowable transmission rate per link. We can then obtain
different regions Λ~δ between these two extremes by varying the dropping probabilities per link. To
understand why this is important suppose that a network user transmitting a data flow with source node
s ∈ S has a higher data rate than that offered by the actual error free network capacity region Λ~δ=~1.
We may then vary the vector ~δ so that the network will fit the requirements of the user. Of course the
average rate of correctly transmitted packets through the network will not change. What will happen
is that, instead of removing part of the user’s packets at entering the network (admission control), the
network will offer per link at least one chance for all packets to be correctly transmitted through the
network, hence will be able to provide unreliable service to the entire required high data rate, with
index of reliablity ~δ.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE SUCCESS FUNCTION AND THE MAXIMUM GOODPUT FUNCTION
The success probability function ql (~p, µl) for transmission over link l ∈ L considered in this work,
has the following properties1.
• P.1 ql is strictly increasing in pl and the log of the function is concave in pl
• P.2 ql is strictly decreasing and convex in pk, ∀k 6= l, k ∈ L
• P.3 ql is strictly decreasing in µl
1The game-theoretic notation ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) is often used, where ~p−l is the entire power vector excluding the l-th element pl.
7• P.4 The log of the function has increasing differences for the pair of variables (pl, µl) meaning that
log ql
(
p+l , ~p−l, µl
)
− log ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) ≤ log ql
(
p+l , ~p−l, µ
+
l
)
− log ql
(
pl, ~p−l, µ
+
l
) (10)
where p+l ≥ pl and µ+l ≥ µl.
• P.5 The log of the function has increasing differences for each pair of variables (pl, pj) , ∀j 6= l.
The differences are constant for all pairs (pi, pj), where i 6= j and i, j ∈ L\ {l}.
The last property actually implies - using [25, Corollary 2.6.1] - that the function is log-supermodular.
By property P.4 a positive change on the transmission power pl has a greater impact on the increase of
the (logarithm of the) success probability, the higher the rate of transmission. If we e.g. transmit with
16-QAM modulation, an increase of power by ∆pl > 0 will increase log q much more than in the case
of transmission with BPSK.
Theorem 2 The success probability function for the Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading case, given in (2) satisfies
properties P.1-P.5.
Proof: For the proof, the expressions (11) - (15) of first and second order partial derivatives are
required. Specifically, from (11) and (12) the function is increasing in pl and decreasing in pj (strictly if
pl ≥ Pminl > 0 and same for j). From (14) the logarithm of the function is concave in pl. The convexity
in P.2 comes directly from the partial derivative of (12) over pj which is easily shown to be positive.
P.3 is shown in (13), whereas P.4 comes directly by derivating (13) w.r.t. pl. Finally, P.5 is a direct
consequence of the fact that - in (15) - ∂2 log ql(~p,µl)
∂pl∂pj
≥ 0 and ∂
2 log ql(~p,µl)
∂pi∂pj
= 0 (see [25, p.42]).
∂ql (pl, ~p−l, µl)
∂pl
= ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) ·
[
σ2γl(µl)
Gllp
2
l
+
∑
j 6=l
1
Gllp
2
l
γl(µl)Gljpj
+pl
]
≥ 0 (11)
∂ql (pl, ~p−l, µl)
∂pj
= −ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) ·
1
Gllpl
γl(µl)Glj
+pj
≤ 0 (12)
∂ql (pl, ~p−l, µl)
∂µl
= ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) ·
[
−σ2eµl
Gllpl
−
∑
j 6=l
eµlGljpj
Gllpl+γl(µl)Gljpj
]
≤ 0 (13)
∂2 log ql (pl, ~p−l, µl)
∂p2l
= −2σ
2γl(µl)
Gllp
3
l
−
∑
j 6=l
2plGll
γl(µl)Gljpj
+1
„
Gllp
2
l
γl(µl)Gljpj
+pl
«2 ≤ 0 (14)
∂2 log ql (pl, ~p−l, µl)
∂pl∂pj
=
Gll
γl(µlGlj)„
Gllpl
γl(µl)Glj
+pj
«
2 ≥ 0. (15)
Using the above properties we can derive important properties for the maximum goodput function in
(4), which as seen in (7) plays a critical role in the definition of the system capacity region.
8Theorem 3 If the success probability function satisfies P.1-P.5 then the maximum goodput function in
(4) has the following properties (where µ¯l (~p) = argmaxµl∈M µlql (~p, µl))
• P’.1 gl (~p) is strictly increasing in pl
• P’.2 gl (~p) is strictly decreasing and convex in pk, ∀k 6= l
• P’.3 µ¯l (~p) is non-decreasing in pl
• P’.4 µ¯l (~p) is non-increasing in pk, ∀k 6= l
Proof: Proofs of P’.1-P’.4 are found in Appendix A.
The above properties are illustrated in Fig.2 and Fig.3 using a success probability function with the
expression in (2) for the 2-user Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading case. These will not be directly used in what
follows but are rather useful for the characterisation of the stability region and the optimal scheduling
policies of such systems. Examples of the goodput region are shown in figures Fig.4 and Fig.5 for two
simple network topologies: 2 transmitting nodes with 1 receiving, 1 transmitting node with 2 receiving.
Remark 1 In economic terms, we can interpret the success probability function ql as the demand of
product l in a market of L firms. In this framework µl is the product’s price and gl is the firm’s revenue.
Then gl (pl, ~p−l, µl) = µl×ql (pl, ~p−l, µl) is firm’s l (revenue) = (price)×(demand). The demand is by P.3
a decreasing function of the price, is increasing by P.1 in pl and decreasing by P.2 in pk, k 6= l. Then
pl can be interpreted as a variable valuating product’s l quality (or maybe the money spent by firm l in
advertisement) and pk as the quality (or money for advertisement) of products from competitors k 6= l.
Then the maximum goodput gl (~p) is the maximum revenue that a firm l can obtain by choosing an
optimal price µ¯l (~p), given a vector ~p. By properties P’.1 and P’.2 the maximum revenue is increasing
in pl and decreasing in pk, k 6= l, whereas by P’.3 and P’.4 the optimal price is also increasing in pl
and decreasing in pk. Notice that if in P.4 log-supermodularity would be replaced by log-submodularity
the optimal price would be a decreasing function of pl.
V. NUM PROBLEM DUAL DECOMPOSITION
The utility maximization problem in (6) given the network capacity region in Th. 1 takes the form
maxxs≥0, gdl ≥0
∑
s∈S Us (xs)
subject to ∑l:e(l)=n gdl + xdn ≤∑k:b(k)=n gdk ∀n, d
~g ∈ co
(
Γˆ
)
= Γ
and Γˆ is given in (7). The constraint set is convex and compact (see [26, Appendix 4.C]), the objective
function is concave and Slater’s condition can be shown to hold, hence strong duality also holds and
9known distributed algorithms, like the one following, can solve the Lagrange dual problem min~λ≥0 L
(
~λ
)
which involves the (N ·D)-vector ~λ of dual variables λdn. The Lagrangian associated with the primal
NUM problem is denoted by L
(
~x,~λ
)
while the dual function L
(
~λ
)
yields, due to the linearity of the
differential operator (see [23], [4], [15])
L
(
~λ
)
=
∑
s∈S
max
xs≥0
{Us (xs)− λsxs}+max
~g∈Γ
∑
n,d
λdn

 ∑
k:b(k)=n
gdk −
∑
l:e(l)=n
gdl


and λs = λdn, xs = xdn for the flow s with source node n and destination d. We can interpret λdn as the
implicit cost per pair (n, d). Thus, the NUM problem is decomposed into:
(a) The input rate control problem
Prob.1 :
∑
s∈S
max
xs≥0
{Us (xs)− λsxs} (16)
solved for each commodity flow at the incoming nodes independently xs = Us´ −1 (λs). Observe that by
assumption Us´ (xs) is continuous and monotone decreasing in R+ (thus a bijection) and the inverse of
the function exists. Since Us (xs) is strictly concave the solution is unique for each λs.
(b) The scheduling problem
Prob.2 : max~g∈Γ
∑
n,d λ
d
n
(∑
k:b(k)=n g
d
k −
∑
l:e(l)=n g
d
l
)
= max
~g∈Γ
∑
l,d
gdl ·
(
λdb(l) − λ
d
e(l)
)
≤ max
~g∈Γ
∑
l
wl · gl (17)
Through each link l the commodity d∗ = argmaxd
(
λdb(l) − λ
d
e(l)
)
is scheduled to be routed with goodput
rate gl and wl = maxd
(
λdb(l) − λ
d
e(l), 0
)
. This is the well known backpressure policy [1]. The solution
of (17) further provides the optimal multicommodity goodput flow variables {g∗l }. The optimal solution
described is very similar to the DRPC policy in [2].
If we can solve (17) distributedly, then algorithms can be provided, that solve the dual problem
minL
(
~λ
)
also in a distributed manner, and converge to the optimal average incoming rate vector ~x∗
and average price vector ~λ∗. The dual problem can be solved by the subgradient method. The prices λdn
for each node-destination pair (n, d) are step-wise adjusted by
λdn (t+ 1) = [λ
d
n (t) + γt · (x
d
n (t)−
∑
k:b(k)=n
gdk (t) +
∑
l:e(l)=n
gdl (t))]
+. (18)
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In the above γt is a positive scalar stepsize, [. . .]+ denotes the projection onto the set R+ and for
each t the values xdn (t) and gdn (t) are calculated by solving problems (16) and (17) respectively and
using prices ~λ (t). As noted in the aforementioned works, in practice a constant stepsize is used for
implementation purposes, although the convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed for γt
t→∞
→ 0. For
constant stepsizes statistical convergence to ~λ∗, ~x∗ is guaranteed as shown in [15, Def.1,Th.2].
VI. THE SCHEDULING PROBLEM
A. Relaxation
As was mentioned previously it is very important that the problem in (17) is solved in a distributed
manner. To this aim the theory of supermodular games can be used. We make the following two
assumptions
1) Assumption 1: Each origin node chooses a single end node to transmit
2) Assumption 2: Each node can transmit and receive at the same time
3) Assumption 3: Fixed scheduled rates per link µl are considered.
Specifically the last assumption constraints the generality of the initial model but is necessary for the
approach that follows. Variable scheduled rates would involve a joint maximization over power allocation
and rates. This would complicate the analysis, but is a rather important topic for future research. The
maximization in (17) can be written as
max
~g∈Γ
∑
l
wl · gl
(a)
= max
~g∈Γˆ
∑
l
wl · gl = max
~p∈Π
∑
n:n=b(l)
∑
n:n=e(l)
wl · µlql (~p, µl)
(b)
= max
pn∈[Pminn ,P
max
n ]
∑
n:n=b(l)
wn · µnqn (~p, µn) (19)
where (a) comes from the fact that the objective function is linear and the supporting hyperplanes to the
sets Γˆ and Γ = co
{
Γˆ
}
are the same, while (b) from Assumption 1. The latter simplifies the problem
to a weighted sum maximization problem with number of summants equal to the number of nodes
and allows the formulation of a noncooperative game in the following subsections, where each node
decides independently over its transmitting power through a single chosen link. The capacity region of
the system in Theorem 1 is of course reduced. An important question is how each node choses the
optimal single link to transmit.
The number of links with node n as origin are all links {l ∈ L : n = b (l) & wl > 0}. This is the
connectivity set of node n. The optimal link is obviously the one which provides maximum weighted
goodput to the above summation, for a given power allocation pn ∈
[
Pminn , P
max
n
]
.
11
Departing here briefly from the main line of the analysis, we end this subsection with a heuristic
suggestion for an almost optimal choice of a single receiver node, using low information exchange
between the network nodes. Applying Markov’s inequality in (1)
ωlµlP (SINRl (~p) ≥ e
µl − 1) ≤
ωlµl
eµl − 1
E (SINRl (~p)) .
Suppose that the end node e (l) of each link l measures the received level of interference, the latter
denoted by Il. This is not any more a random variable with unknown realization but rather a known
deterministic quantity. The right handside then reduces to
ωlµl
eµl − 1
E (Gl,lFl,lpl)(
Il + σ2e(l)
) = ωlµl
eµl − 1
Gl,lpl(
Il + σ2e(l)
) . (20)
This is an upper bound on the actual error probability. The process of the sub-optimal choice then is as
follows. Each destination node of links belonging to the connectivity set of node n, informs the origin
node over Il + σ2e(l) and afterwards n chooses to transmit over the link with the maximum ratio (20),
since Gl,l, ωl and µl are known to n.
An alternative way to choose a single receiver node could be by assigning to each element of the
connectivity set a probability, with sum equal to one per transmitting node, and the choice will then be
a random process.
B. Optimality conditions
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions and observing that the active inequality
constraint gradients are linearly independent [27, pp.315-317] all feasible vectors ~p are regular and we
have the following necessary conditions for ~p∗ to be a local maximizer of the objective function in (19).
0 =
∂
∂pn
L
(
~p∗, ~νl, ~νu
)
= νln − ν
u
n + ωn · µn
∂qn (~p
∗, µn)
∂pn
+
∑
m6=n
ωm · µm
∂qm (~p
∗, µm)
∂pn
(21)
for each n and the complementary slackness conditions satisfy
νln ·
(
Pminn − p
∗
n
)
= 0 & νun · (p
∗
n − P
max
n ) = 0 (22)
L
(
~p∗, ~νl, ~νu
)
is the Lagrangian of the problem in (19). The conditions are only necessary and not
sufficient. We make here the remark that if the objective function were concave, the dual gap would be
zero and any local maximizer would also be global for the problem at hand. In this case the conditions
would also be sufficient. Unfortunately this generaly does not hold for the specific objective function.
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Divide (21) and (22) by qn (~p∗, µn) (which is definitely positive if we choose Pminn > 0, ∀n ∈ N )
and then - approching the problem similarly to [16] - set
0 ≥ ωm · µm
∂qm (~p, µm)
∂pn
1
qn (~p, µn)
=
πm,n (~p)
qn (~p, µn)
(23)
= πˆm,n (~p) (24)
and for the Lagrange multipliers
νˆun =
νun
qn (~p∗, µn)
≥ 0 & νˆln =
νln
qn(~p∗,µn)
≥ 0. (25)
With the above substitutions the per node condition in (21) is rewritten as
ωn · µn
1
qn (~p∗, µn)
∂qn (~p
∗, µn)
∂pn
+
∑
m6=n
πˆm,n (~p
∗) = νˆun − νˆ
l
n. (26)
Then (26) with the related complementary slackness conditions are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for p∗n to be the global maximizer of the problem
maxpn ωnµn log
(
qn
(
pn; ~p
∗
−n, µn
))
+ pn
∑
m6=n πˆm,n (~p
∗) (27)
since by property P.1 of the success function, log qn (~p, µn) is concave in pn, the constraint set pn ∈[
Pminn , P
max
n
]
is convex and compact and Slater’s condition holds true. This explains now why the
division in (23) and (25) was required.
C. A Supermodular Game
If we view −πˆm,n (~p) as the price charged by user m to user n for affecting its goodput by
creating interference, we can approach the solution to the optimal power allocation problem in a
distributed fashion with the use of game theory. We denote the noncooperative game by the triple
G = (N ,Π, {Jn (·) , n ∈ N}) where N are the players, Π is the set of feasible joint strategies and Jn
is the payoff function for user n.
We distinguish between two types of players. First, the power players who belong to the set N p,
each one of which represents a node and the set of feasible joint strategies Πp is identical to the set Π
of feasible power allocations. Their payoff function equals
Jn (pn; ~p−n, (πˆm,n)) = ωnµn log (qn (pn; ~p−n, µn)) + pn ·
∑
m6=n
πˆm,n (28)
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We often set cn :=
∑
m6=n πˆm,n to emphasize the dependence of Jn on the sum instead of the individual
prices. The best response correspondence for player n is the set
Yn (~p−n) = arg max
pn∈Πn(~p−n)
Jn (pn; ~p−n, (πˆm,n)) (29)
where Πn (~p−n) = {pn : (pn, ~p−n) ∈ Πp}.
Second, the price players who belong to the set N pr := {(m,n) : m 6= n, m, n ∈ N} with cardinality
N × (N − 1). The feasible set of strategies for player (m,n) is
Πprm,n =
{
πˆm,n ∈
[
min
~p∈Π
πˆm,n (~p) , 0
]}
(30)
where πˆm,n (~p) is given in (24). The best response for a price player is denoted by (following [16])
Y prm,n = arg max
πˆm,n∈Π
pr
m,n
− (πˆm,n − πˆm,n (~p))
2 (31)
and Πpr =
{
Π(2,1), . . . ,Π(N−1,N)
}
is the joint feasible set.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) for the game G is defined as the set of power vectors ~pe = (pe1, . . . , peN)
and price vectors ~ˆπe =
(
πˆe2,1, . . . , πˆ
e
n,1, . . . , πˆ
e
1,n, . . . , πˆ
e
n−1,n
)
with the property for every n,m ∈ N p and
every (m,n) ∈ N pr
Jn
(
pen, ~p
e
−n, (πˆ
e
m,n)
)
≥ Jn
(
pn, ~p
e
−n, (πˆ
e
m,n)
)
, & πˆem,n = πˆm,n (~p
e) , ∀pn ∈ Πn
(
~pe−n
) (32)
Hence pen belongs to the best response correspondence of player n, ∀n ∈ N p, given the equilibrium
prices, whereas πˆem,n belongs to the best response correspondence of player (m,n) ∈ N pr given the
equilibrium powers.
The existence and uniqueness of the NE when the prices do not take part as players in the game has
been proven in [28, Th.III.1] under mild assumptions on the problem parameters usually satisfied in
practice. In our case however with N+N×(N − 1) = N2 players the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
is not guaranteed. We can however make use of the theory of supermodular games, exploiting the
structure of the payoff function in (28) to find algorithms that converge to one of the Nash Equilibria.
We first give the definition of a supermodular game from Topkis [25]
Definition 1 A noncooperative game with N players {N ,Π, {fn : n ∈ N}}, each having strategy xn
belonging to the feasible set of strategies Πn (~x−n), is supermodular if the set Π of feasible joint
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strategies is a sublattice of RN and for each n the payoff function fn is supermodular in player n’s
strategy xn and has increasing differences for all pairs (xi, xj) ∈ Πi ×Πj , i 6= j, i, j ∈ N .
Theorem 4 The noncooperative game with N power players and N × (N − 1) price players is a
supermodular game [25, p.178]. Furthermore, the set of equilibrium points is a nonempty complete
lattice and a greatest and least equilibrium point exist.
Proof: See Appendix B.
After proving that the problem at hand has the desired properties so that supermodular game theory can
be applied we prove in the following that the Nash Equilibria of the game are exactly the power alloca-
tions that satisfy the KKT necessary optimality conditions of the original sum weighted maximization
problem.
Theorem 5 Under the condition that ∀n, Pminn > 0, a power vector ~pe is a Nash Equilibrium of the
supermodular power-price game if and only if it satisfies the necessary optimality conditions (21)-(22).
Proof: See Appendix C.
The above theorem is rather important because it shows that the formulated game leads to one of
the solutions of the scheduling problem. If the objective function in (19) is concave then the NE is
also unique and the game converges to the unique global maximizer. The suboptimality of the proposed
scheme in the current work thus lies solely on the fact that the KKT conditions are only necessary but
not sufficient. If we can define the region of Π for which the objective function is concave and restrict
the feasible power allocations to that, the suggested distributed solution is the optimal one. This can be
a topic for future investigations.
D. The Scheduling Algorithm
In the current paragraph we provide an algorithm which updates for each player the power allocation
pn and the price πm,n. Starting from any initial point within the joint feasible region, the algorithm will
eventually converge to a NE bounded component-wise by the greatest and least NE. It is related to the
Round-Robin optimization for supermodular games [25, Ch. 4.3.1], versions of which are suggested in
[16] and [17].
The algorithm has two phases for each iteration t and is given in Table I. The power update phase
calculates the best response for each user n by (28) given fixed prices πˆ(t)m,n and the opponents’ decisions
~p
(t)
−n.
During the price update phase each user m calculates (N − 1) new prices π(t)m,n (without the hat) by
(23) given the updated power vector. Then all users m 6= n communicate the values π(t)m,n to user n,
who divides their sum by qn (~p, µn) to form the new sum price c(t+1)n for the next power update phase.
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Observe that for each iteration, user n should know: (a) Its own rate of transmission µn (which defines
qn) and weight ωn, (b) the power profile of the other users ~p−n, (c) the prices πm,n communicated by
the interfering users and (d) the slow fading coefficients Gm,n which depend on the distance between
the nodes.
E. Implementation Issues
Considering implementation issues of the algorithm, information (b) and (c) should be communicated
to node n, while (d) should be globally known. Notice that communicating the information over the
power profile of the interfering users will violate the distributed nature of the algorithm. Instead of
the power vector ~p−n however, it suffices for each user to measure the current level of interference
In =
∑
m6=nGmnFmnpm in which case we write
qˆn (pn, In, µn) = P
(
GnnFnnpn
In + σ2e(l)
≥ γn (µn)
)
Rayl.
= exp

−
(
In + σ2e(l)
)
γn (µn)
Gnnpn


where l : b(l) = n and the second equality holds for Rayleigh fading. The payoff function will change
accordingly. In the price update phase observe that the partial derivative of qˆm with respect to pn will
be given by
πm,n
ωmµm
=
∂qˆm (pm, Im, µm)
∂pn
=
∂qˆm (pm, Im, µm)
∂Im
∂Im
∂pn
= −
φm (pm, Im)
ωmµm
GnmFnm (33)
The new values φm can be computed by each user m and are independent of the destination user n.
φm (pm, Im)
Rayl.
= ωmµmqˆm (pm, Im, µm)
(
γm (µm)
Gmmpm
)
In the form (33) observe that the actual realization of the random variable Fnm appears. Remember that
Fnm is the fast fading channel power coefficient. This information is unknown. But node n is interested
in the sum cn of the prices πˆm,n (see (41)) which can be written as
cn = −
1
qn (pn; In, µn)
∑
m6=n
GnmFnmφm (pm, Im) (34)
If each node m 6= n broadcasts a sequence of random symbols Sm, |Sm|2 = 1 with power
√
φm (pm, Im)
the received signal at node n will be (assuming reciprocity of the channel gains)
Yn =
∑
m6=n
Hnm
√
φm (pm, Im)Sm +Noise (35)
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and its power is |Yn|2 =
∑
m6=nGnmFnmφm (pm, Im)+σ
2
n. If the receiving node n divides by−qn (pn; In, µn)
we get a noisy version of the expression in (34).
The above idea is borrowed from recent works that deal with ways to use the Wireless Multiple
Access Channel (MAC) in order to compute general functions of data among which is also addition
[29]. The above method using power to convey information can be found specifically in [30]. From the
above we realize that although the fast fading coefficients are not known to the users m that have to
calculate the prices πm,n these can be revealed to the receiver n within the sum signal in (34).
Finally rather important is the fact that for the implementation of the algorithm, each user m has to
be aware of its received interference Im and actually calculate only a single price φm. Then in a single
step during the price update phase each player/node broadcasts its price φm, while acting simultaneously
as a receiver (remember Assumption 2) to obtain the channel-power-weighted sum of the prices of the
other N − 1 users. The entire network topology is not any more necessary to be known to each user
m, only the slow fading gain Gmm. This allows the scheduling algorithm to have as well application
in cases where the topology possibly changes due to user mobility.
VII. SIMULATIONS
Simulation results of the proposed scheme for congestion control, routing and distributed power
allocation when hop-by-hop retransmissions are taken into account are presented in Fig.6. We used a
four node topology having two commodity flows with sorce node 1 and destination nodes 3 and 4
respectively. The congestion control requires the solution of the subproblems (16) and (17) respectively
with prices ~λ (t). The prices are updated per node using the expression in (18). The optimal links per
node are chosen at each step using (20). The scheduling problem in (19) is solved initially by brut force
(left column) to provide a comparison with the results obtained when the price based algorithm is used
(right column). We notice that although the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium cannot be guaranteed
the results of the suggested algorithm considering the maximum supported incoming rate as well as the
queue length (price λ1) are almost optimal. An important remark is that the two solutions would be
exactly the same if the objective function in (19) would be concave.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
In the following we will neglect the dependence of functions on variables that are considered constant
throughout a proof.
• P’.1: Suppose p+l > pl and let µ+l := argmaxµl∈M µlql
(
p+l , µl
)
, and also µ¯l := argmaxµl∈M µlql (pl, µl).
Then ∀µl ∈M
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µ+l ql
(
p+l , µ
+
l
) (a)
≥ µlql
(
p+l , µl
) (b)
> µlql (pl, µl)
In the above, (a) comes from the definition of µ+l and (b) from P.1 of the success probability
function. Since the inequality holds ∀µl it also holds for µl = µ¯l, hence gl
(
p+l , ~p−l
)
> gl (pl, ~p−l).
• P’.2: For the monotonicity we proceed as above, where p+k > pk, µ+l := argmaxµl∈M µlql
(
p+k , µl
)
,
and also µ¯l := argmaxµl∈M µlql (pk, µl). Then ∀µl ∈M
µ¯lql (pk, µ¯l)
(c)
≥ µlql (pk, µl)
(d)
> µlql
(
p+k , µl
)
where (c) comes from the definition of µ+l and (d) from the monotonicity in P.2. Since the inequality
holds ∀µl it also holds for µl = µ+l , hence gl
(
p+k , ~p−k
)
< gl (pk, ~p−k).
For the convexity we write for p(1)k 6= p
(2)
k
gl
(
θp
(1)
k + (1− θ) p
(2)
k
)
= max
µl
µlql
(
θp
(1)
k + (1− θ) p
(2)
k , µl
) (P.2)
≤
max
µl
{
θµlql
(
p
(1)
k , µl
)
+ (1− θ)µlql
(
p
(2)
k , µl
)}
≤ max
µl
θµlql
(
p
(1)
k , µl
)
+max
µl
(1− θ)µlql
(
p
(2)
k , µl
)
= θgl
(
p
(1)
k , ~p−k
)
+ (1− θ) gl
(
p
(2)
k , ~p−k
)
• P’.3 Choose pbl ≥ pal and denote µbl := argmaxµl∈M µlql
(
pbl , µl
)
, and also µal := argmaxµl∈M µlql (pal , µl).
By definition
µblql
(
pbl , µ
b
l
)
≥ µal ql
(
pbl , µ
a
l
)
⇒
µbl
µal
≥
ql
(
pbl , µ
a
l
)
ql
(
pbl , µ
b
l
) (36)
We prove the property by contradiction. Suppose that µbl < µal . From the log-supermodularity
property P.4
ql
(
pbl , µ
a
l
)
ql (pal , µ
a
l )
>
ql
(
pbl , µ
b
l
)
ql
(
pal , µ
b
l
) (37)
Combining (36) and (37)
µbl
µal
(36)
≥
ql
(
pbl , µ
a
l
)
ql
(
pbl , µ
b
l
) (37)> ql (pal , µal )
ql
(
pal , µ
b
l
) ⇒ µblql (pal , µbl) > µal ql (pal , µal ) (38)
But (38) is impossible from the definition of µal := argmaxµl∈M µlql (pal , µl) hence µbl ≥ µal .
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• P’.4: We make use of the fact that given a pair
(
p
(1)
l , µ
(1)
l
)
there always exists another one(
p
(2)
l , µ
(2)
l
)
, with p(1)l 6= p
(2)
l and µ
(1)
l 6= µ
(2)
l such that ql
(
p
(1)
l , ~p−l, µ
(1)
l
)
= ql
(
p
(2)
l , ~p−l, µ
(2)
l
)
.
This is because ∀µl ∈ M, the success probability function ql (pl, µl) ∈ [0, 1] is strictly increasing
in pl and strictly decreasing in µl by P.1 and P.3 (here pl ∈ R+).
Denote by µbl := argmaxµl∈M µlql
(
pbk, µl
)
, and also µal := argmaxµl∈M µlql (pak, µl).
Using the above fact we can write ql (pl, pak, µal ) = ql (pal , pak, µl) and ql
(
pl, p
b
k, µ
b
l
)
= ql
(
pbl , p
b
k, µl
)
,
e.g. for some µl ≥ max
{
µal , µ
b
l
}
, pal ≥ pl and pbl ≥ pl. By definition
µbl
µal
≥
ql
(
pl, p
b
k, µ
a
l
)
ql
(
pl, p
b
k, µ
b
l
) = ql
(
pal , p
b
k, µl
)
ql
(
pbl , p
b
k, µl
) (39)
The property is proven by contradiction.. Choose pbk ≥ pak and suppose that
µbl ≥ µ
a
l
(P.3)
⇔ ql
(
pl, p
b
k, µ
b
l
)
≤ ql
(
pl, p
b
k, µ
a
l
)
⇔
ql
(
pbl , p
b
k, µl
)
≤ ql
(
pal , p
b
k, µl
) (P.1)
⇔ pbl ≤ p
a
l (40)
From the log-supermodularity property P.5 we reach the inequality µblql
(
pl, p
a
k, µ
b
l
)
≥ µal ql (pl, p
a
k, µ
a
l )
which is impossible by the definition of µal ⇒ pbl ≤ pal is impossible ⇔ µbl ≥ µal is impossible.
B. Proof of Theorem 6
The set of joint feasible strategies Πp×Πpr ∈ RN2 is a sublattice of RN2 . The set is also compact since
for a power player n ∈ N p, pn ∈
[
Pminn , P
max
n
]
while for a price player πm,n ∈ [min~p∈Πp πˆm,n (~p) , 0]
and the lowest endpoint of the interval is > −∞ for Pminn ≥ ǫ > 0, ∀n (see the expression for the
success probability (2) and its derivative (11).
Since the set of feasible strategies for power player n is a compact subset of R1 the payoff function
in (28) is supermodular in pn. We have further seen in property P.5 that the logarithm of the success
probability function of user n has increasing differences for each pair (pn, pm) , ∀m 6= n and constant
differences for each pair (pm1 , pm2), m1 6= n, m2 6= n. Then log qn (~p, µn) is supermodular in ~p ∈ Πp.
Observe that pn ·
∑
m6=n πˆm,n is also supermodular and by property [25, Lemma 2.6.1(b)] the sum of
supermodular functions is supermodular. We reach the conclusion that Jn = ωnµn · log qn (~p, µn)+ cnpn
has increasing differences in all pairs (pi, pj) for distinct i, j ∈ N p.
The expression for Jn in (28) is a valuation (has constant differences) for each pair (πˆi,n, πˆj,n),
i, j 6= n. Finally for the pairs (pi, πˆj,n) the function has also increasing differences if i = n and is
a valuation for i 6= n. Then we reach the conclusion that Jn has increasing differences for each pair
(xi, xj), i, j ∈ N p ∪N pr. By definition 1 the game is supermodular.
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The set of feasible joint startegies Πp×Πpr is shown to be compact. Observing that the expression in
(2) and hence Jn is continuous in pn and having proven that the game is supermodular, the ’Furthermore’
part of the theorem comes from [25, Th.4.2.1].
C. Proof of Theorem 7
The ’if’ part comes directly from the way the extended supermodular game was formulated. For the
’only if’ part we argue as follows. Suppose ~pe is a Nash Equilibrium of the problem. Then for each n
pen = argmaxpn∈[Pminn ,Pmaxn ]
{
ωnµn log qn
(
pn; ~p
e
−n, µn
)
+ pn
∑
m6=n
πˆem,n
}
= argmaxpn∈[Pminn ,Pmaxn ]
{
ωnµn log qn
(
pn; ~p
e
−n, µn
)
+ pn
∑
m6=n
ωmµm
qn (~pe, µn)
∂qm (~p
e, µm)
∂pn
}
= argmaxpn∈[Pminn ,Pmaxn ]
{
ωnµn log qn
(
pn; ~p
e
−n, µn
)
· qn (~p
e, µn) + pn
∑
m6=n
ωmµm
∂qm (~p
e, µm)
∂pn
}
The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the above problem are
ωnµn
∂qn
(
pn; ~p
e
−n, µn
)
∂pn
·
qn (~p
e, µn)
qn (pn, ~p
e
−n, µn)
+
∑
m6=n
ωmµm
∂qm (~p
e, µm)
∂pn
+ νln − ν
u
n = 0
νln ·
(
Pminn − pn
)
≥ 0 & νun · (pn − P
max
n ) ≥ 0
Since pen is the global maximizer (remember that the objective function is concave) the necessary
conditions (21)-(22) of the scheduling problem are satisfied ∀n.
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FIGURES
Fig. 1. An example of the wireless network with a single commodity d = 4. Detail of node 3
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Fig. 2. We simulate a 2-user Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading channel with set of rates M = {0.4, 0.8, . . . , 2} and p2 = 5 Watt, P1 = 20
Watt. Properties P’.1 and P’.3 are illustrated a. Maximum Goodput g1(p1, p2) vs power p1, b. Optimal rate µ¯1 (p1, p2) vs power p1.
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Fig. 3. We simulate a 2-user Rayleigh/Rayleigh fading channel with set of rates M = {0.4, 0.8, . . . , 2} and p2 = 20 Watt, P1 = 25
Watt. Properties P’.2 and P’.4 are illustrated a. Maximum Goodput g1(p1, p2) vs power p2, b. Optimal rate µ¯1 (p1, p2) vs power p2.
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Fig. 4. The 2-user Rayleigh/Rayleigh goodput region Γˆ1 and Γ1 for the network of 2 transmitters and a single receiver. The convex
hull is shown with the dashed dot lines. For the illustration M = {0.4, 0.8, . . . , 1.8}, Pmax1 = 2 Watt, Pmax2 = 3 Watt and the success
probability function in (2) has been used with G1,1 = G1,2 = 1, G2,2 = G2,1 = 1.
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Fig. 5. The 2-user Rayleigh/Rayleigh goodput region Γˆ2 and Γ2 for the network consisting of 1 transmitter and 2 receivers. The convex
hull is shown with the dashed dot lines. For this topology, M = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}, p1 + p2 ≤ P = 10 Watt and the success probability
function in (2) has been used with G1,1 = G2,2 = 1, G1,2 = 0.5, G2,1 = 0.8.
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Distributed Algorithm for the Scheduling Problem
INITIALIZE
• Choose the least element of Πp × Πpr:
(
Pminn
)
for the power players and (min~p∈Πp πˆm,n (~p)) for
the price players.
• Set t = 0, k = 0.
REPEAT
1) Power Update: For k = 1, . . . , N
• Given
(
πˆ
(t)
m,n
)
and ~p(t,k−1)
p
(t,k)
k = argmaxpk∈[Pmink ,Pmaxk ]
J
(t)
k
(
pk; ~p
(t,k−1)
−k
)
where Jk is given in (28).
• ~p
(t,k)
−k = ~p
(t,k−1)
−k
2) Price Update:
• For k = 1, . . . , N . Given ~p(t,N) each user k updates the N − 1 prices πk,n for k 6= n
πk,n
(
~p(t,N)
)
= ωk · µk
∂qk
(
~p(t,N), µk
)
∂pn
and communicates them to user n
• Each user n receives N − 1 prices πk,n and calculates
πˆk,n
(
~p(t,N)
)
=
πk,n
(
~p(t,N)
)
qn (~p(t,N), µk)
c(t+1)n =
∑
k
πˆk,n
(
~p(t,N)
) (41)
3) Increase t by 1
• Set ~p(t,0) = ~p(t−1,N). Set
(
πˆ
(t)
m,n
)
=
(
πˆm,n
(
~p(t−1,N)
))
UNTIL ~p(t,0) = ~p(t−1,0) and
(
πˆ
(t)
m,n
)
=
(
πˆ
(t−1)
m,n
)
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Fig. 6. Congestion control for a four node topology with two commodity flows. The scheduling problem is solved using the suggested
pricing algorithm. Comparison plots with a brut force search to find the global optimum of the weighted sum maximization problem in
(19) are provided in the first column.
